We consider a single server queueing system with admission control and the possibility to switch dynamically between a low and a high service rate, and examine the benefit of this service rate flexibility. We formulate a discounted Markov Decision Process model for the problem of joint admission and service control, and show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure for both controls. Regarding the benefit due to flexibility, we show that it is increasing in system congestion, and that its effect on the admission policy is to increase the admission threshold. We also derive a simple approximate condition between the admission reward and the relative cost of service rate increase, so that the service rate flexibility is beneficial. We finally show that the results extend to the expected average reward case.
Introduction
Admission control is a queue management tool that can increase the efficiency of resource utilization in many service systems. Depending on the particular application, it can be used to preserve system capacity for future customers who bring higher profit, to limit the number of admitted customers in order to provide a better quality of service to those already in, etc. Admission control is often employed indirectly via dynamic pricing, or by price discrimination (direct or indirect) among different customer types. However in several situations frequent price changes may not be feasible, and in order to contain congestion denying service to certain arriving customers may be necessary.
On the other hand, in several queueing systems it is possible to alleviate the congestion effects by adjusting the service capacity. For example in banks or call centers the number of servers may change during the day to follow variations of the arrival rate. The service rate may also be varied dynamically when the queue length becomes too long. Increasing (and in some cases decreasing) the service rate comes at a cost, but it has the advantage over admission control policies that fewer or no customers are turned away. It is thus of interest to explore to what extent a flexibility in service capacity can interact with admission control and when it can alleviate its effects.
In this paper we investigate the interaction of service rate flexibility and admission control in an M/M/1 queueing system. The flexibility is modeled as the option to switch dynamically between a low and a high service rate. We analyze the problem of joint admission and service rate control by formulating a Markovian Decision Process model to maximize the infinite horizon expected discounted profit.
We also explore the effect of service rate flexibility on the optimal profit and the admission thresholds. Specifically, the benefit of the service rate switch option is compared against a baseline case where only the low service rate is used and admission control is employed. Thus, in principle, the benefit is due both to the existence of a higher service rate as well as the flexibility to use it. On the other hand, the higher service rate is not free but comes at a higher cost, thus the benefit of using it reflects the tradeoff between serving at a faster rate and paying higher operational costs. When we use the term benefit of flexibility we mean exactly how this tradeoff manifests itself in the presence of admission control.
The paper develops a model of dynamic optimization of queueing systems, a large area with very extensive literature. Both admission and service control models have been studied thoroughly. Stidham and Weber (1993) and Walrand (1988) survey several dynamic optimization models developed for queueing control.
For single class customers problems, as the one analyzed in this paper, admission control makes sense when there is an exogenous holding cost rate function. A simple model in this direction was first presented in Naor (1969) , where arriving customers are admitted or not based on the observed queue length with the objective to maximize customer's overall (social) benefit from receiving a reward after service completion minus a linear increasing holding cost per unit time of delay. It is shown that a socially optimal policy admits fewer customers than those who would decide to enter based on an individual optimality criterion. Stidham (1985) considers a GI/M/1 queue under infinite horizon discounted cost, assuming a convex and nondecreasing holding cost rate function. It is shown that the optimal policy has a threshold structure if and only if the optimal benefit is concave in the number of customers in the system which in turn depends on convexity of the holding cost rate function. As in Stidham (1985) , we also consider a convex, nondecreasing holding cost rate which implies a threshold property of the optimal admission policy.
On the other hand in multi-class systems with finite capacity admission control may be useful even in the absence of holding costs, because in this case admitting a customer implies the possibility of a loss of profit from a future higher class customer. Miller (1969) considers a system with n parallel and identical servers, no waiting room and m customer classes, which contribute to the system, different fixed rewards. This model results in a threshold type optimal policy with a preferred class. Lippman and Ross (1971) analyze the optimal admission rule for a system with one server and no waiting room which receives offers from customers according to a joint service time and reward probability distribution. Carrizosa et al. (1998) and Ormeci et al. (2001) also investigate properties of optimal admission policies for certain loss systems. Carrizosa et al. (1998) develop an optimal static admission policy in an M/G/c/c queueing system with k customer classes with generally different service requirements and service rewards. Ormeci et al. (2001) examine the problem of dynamic admission control in a two class loss Markovian queueing system with different service rates and different fixed rewards for the two customer classes.
The admission control problem has been also analyzed in queueing systems under heavy traffic. An often used approach In this framework the dynamic optimization is usually approximated by a diffusion control problem, following the approach of Harrison (1988) . Recent works in this area include Ward and Kumar (2008) and Kocaga and Ward (2010) , both analyzing admission control under customer abandonments. Ward and Kumar (2008) analyze a GI/G/1 queue in the balanced heavy traffic regime, where the optimal control depends on the sample path of the diffusion and the resulting asymptotically admission control policy of threshold type depends on second moment data of the interarrival and service times. Kocaga and Ward (2010) consider the same problem in amulti-class environment under discounted expected cost minimization.
Dynamic service control in queueing systems is an equally large field. Several problems can be viewed as service control models, including controlled server vacations, server allocation policies in polling systems, etc. In an early work Crabill (1974) examines dynamic service control under infinite horizon expected average expected cost in a maintenance system with finite available service rates, a linear holding cost rate and a reward collected in service completions. It is shown that the optimal service rate is increasing in the number of customers waiting in line. The monotonicity of the optimal service rate is also shown in Lippman (1975) in the framework of an M/M/1 queue, with service rates varying in a closed set and the holding cost rate increasing and convex. George and Harrison (2001) consider the service control problem in an M/M/1 queue where service rates are dynamically selected from a close subset of [0, ∞], under no switching cost, state-dependent holding cost and rate dependent service cost. They develop an asymptotic method for computing the optimal policy under average cost minimization by solving a sequence of approximating problems, each involving a truncation of the holding cost function. They prove that the optimal policies of the approximating problems converge monotonically to the optimal policy of the original problem and derive an implementable policy and a performance bound at each iteration. In our model we also derive a monotonicity property of the service control component of the problem, under a convexity assumption on the holding cost function. In the works mentioned above there are no switching costs for changing the service rate. We refer to Lu and Serfozo (1984) , Hipp and Holzbaur (1988) and Kitaev and Serfozo (1999) for models that include service rate switching costs, resulting in hysteretic policies.
In the area of joint admission and service control, two works related to ours are Ata and Shneorson (2006) and Adusumilli and Hasenbein (2010) , both motivated by and extending the work of George and Harrison (2001) . Ata and Shneorson (2006) consider the joint admission and service control problem in an M/M/1 queue with adjustable arrival and service rates, under long-run average welfare maximization. They also formulate and solve an associated dynamic pricing problem. They show that the optimal arrival and service rates are monotone in the system length. However the optimal prices, which are set to induce the optimal arrival and service rates, are not necessarily monotone. Finally, they find that dynamic policies can result in significantly higher profits compared to static policies. Similarly to Ata and Shneorson (2006) , Adusumilli and Hasenbein (2010) develop an efficient iterative method for computing the optimal policy under an average cost criterion, providing a computable upper bound on the optimality gap at each iteration step. It is also shown that service rates are monotone increasing in the system state. Finally, two works which consider the joint admission and service control problem in the heavy traffic regime are included in Ghosh and Weerasinghe (2007) and Ghosh and Weerasinghe (2010) . Ghosh and Weerasinghe (2007) examine a queueing network where a central planner dynamically selects the service rate and buffer size that min-imize the long-run average expected cost. The optimal policy is derived from the solution of a Brownian control problem and it consists of a feedback-type drift control and a threshold type admission policy. Ghosh and Weerasinghe (2010) consider a Markovian system with customer abandonments and address the infinite horizon discounted problem. In contrast to Ghosh and Weerasinghe (2007) , it is proved that the optimal joint dynamic policy derived from the solution of the Brownian control problem is asymptotically optimal for the original problem.
In our paper we consider a simpler admission-service control model with two available service rates and explore the benefit of the service-rate flexibility. We first show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure for both controls. We introduce the value of the service rate control as the expected profit increase in the optimal admission control subproblem when the dynamic service rate change option becomes available, and show that the value is increasing with the initial level of congestion. Furthermore, the effect on the optimal policy is to increase the admission threshold. We also derive a simple sufficient condition between the admission reward and the service cost so that the service flexibility is worthless. Finally, we extend the results in the long-run average expected reward case and show that an optimal average reward policy exists and it can be computed as a limit function of a sequence of optimal discount policies under a sufficient condition on the holding cost rate function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the joint control model, show several properties of the value function and establish the threshold structure of the optimal policy. In Section 3 we analyze the value of service flexibility and the effect of the high service rate switch option on the admission policy. In Section 4 we analyze the problem under the average reward criterion. In Section 5 we consider a variation of the original model, in which the service reward is collected at departure epochs and show that the main results still hold. In Section 6 we present a set of computational experiments exploring the sensitivity in the system parameters. Section 7 concludes.
Model Description
We consider a single server Markovian queue under the FCFS discipline, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ. The service rate may be dynamically set to either a low or a high value, µ l < µ h , without any switching cost. The service provider receives a fixed reward R ≥ 0 per customer admitted, and incurs holding and service costs as follows. The holding cost is equal to h(x) per unit time, where x is the number of customers in the system. The function h(x) is assumed to be increasing and convex. The service cost is equal to c l or c h per unit time, for using service rates µ l and µ h , respectively, where c l < c h . We also assume that the low cost rate c l is incurred even when the system is empty, because of the presence of fixed costs. Let c = c h − c l denote the service overhead paid under high service speed. Without loss of generality we normalize c l = h(0) = 0.
Since the system is Markovian, it suffices to assume that the system manager makes a decision at both arrival and departure epochs. Service rate decisions can be made at both arrival and departure epochs, whereas admission decisions are made only at arrival epochs. Assuming continuous time discounting at rate β > 0, the service provider's objective is to maximize the infinite horizon expected discounted net profit. Thus, the problem can be framed as a continuous time Markov Decision Process, as follows.
Let T j be the time of the j th arrival, X(t) a random variable denoting the number of customers in the system at time t and I(t) = 1(t = T j for some j) the indicator of the event that t is an arrival epoch. We define the state vector as the pair (X(t), I(t)), thus the state space is S = IN 0 × {0, 1}. State (0, 0) denotes an empty system.
For the action set, let A s (t) ∈ {l, h} denote the service rate employed at time t, where l, h stand for service rates µ l , µ h , respectively, and A d (T j ) ∈ {0, 1} the admission decision at the j th arrival epoch, where 0, 1 denote rejection and admission, respectively. In states (X(t), I(t)) = (x, 1) corresponding to arrival epochs, the action is defined by the pair a(t) = (a d (t), a s (t)), thus the action set is A(x, 1) = {0, 1} × {l, h}. On the other hand, in states (X(t), I(t)) = (x, 0) corresponding to departure epochs, the action is defined only by a s (t), thus the action set is A(x, 0) = {l, h}. Finally, let Π be the space of history dependent policies and υ π β (x, i) denote the infinite horizon expected β−discounted net profit with initial state (
The optimal value function is
and a policy π * is optimal if υ π * β = υ β .
An Equivalent Model in Discrete Time
We can construct a discrete-time version of the Markovian Decision problem as follows. Depending on the state and the action employed, the transition rate out of any state can take values λ, λ + µ l , or λ + µ h . Let Λ = λ + µ h denote the maximum transition rate out of any state. Using standard uniformization arguments (see Section 11.5 of Puterman (1994) ), it follows that the model described in (1) is equivalent to a model where transition rates are all equal to Λ and the transition probabilities are appropriately modified. Since in the original continuous time model the transition rates out of a state are generally different in different states, the discrete time formulation allows for transitions from a state back to itself so that the expected sojourn times are equal in the two models. These are referred to as fictictions transitions. Via this transformation, the problem can be written in a form equivalent to a discrete time discounted Markov Decision Process, as follows
where δ = µ h − µ l and for simplicity we omit the subscript β which is constant throughout. Note that in the discrete time formulation, the equivalent discount factor per transition is equal to α = Λ Λ+β and for β > 0 it has the standard property 0 < α < 1. For ease of the exposition we normalize the time scale so that Λ + β = 1. The normalization is without loss of generality as long as the discount rate is fixed. In Section 3 where we consider the criterion of average reward per unit-time as a limit of the discounted reward problem when β → 0 and thus α → 1, we do not make this normalization assumption.
The finite horizon version of this last model is the following, where υ n (x, i) denotes the optimal discounted profit for the remaining n transitions, starting at state (x, i).
Note that in (5) the transition index on the right hand side is still n + 1, because after an admission decision in state (x, 1) there is an instantaneous state switch to state (x + 1, 0) or (x, 0), so that the corresponding service-rate decision can also be made at that instant. The advantage of writing the optimality equations in this form is that only admission decisions are made in states (x, 1) and only service decisions in states (x, 0). Since the state space is infinite and the one-step reward function is not necessarily bounded, the convergence of (5)- (8) to the optimal value function must be established.
To this end, we make the following assumption ensuring that the holding cost does not increase too rapidly with the queue length.
Assumption 1
1. There exists a constant θ > 1 such that: h(x + 1) ≤ θh(x), for any x > 0.
2. There exists a constant α ∈ [0, 1) and a positive integer J such that: for x ≥ 0,
Assumption 1 is quite general. It can be easily seen that it is satisfied for power cost functions h(x) = Kx m , K > 0, m ≥ 1 as well as exponential cost functions h(x) = Kρ x with K > 0 and ρ ∈ (1, 1 Λ ). In the next theorem we show that under Assumption 1 there exists an optimal policy for the discounted problem and the finite horizon approximations converge to the unique solution of (2)-(4).
Theorem 1 If the holding cost rate function h(x) satisfies Assumption 1, then i. The system of equations (2)-(4) has a unique solution, which equals υ * β .
ii. There exists a stationary deterministic optimal policy.
iii. The solution of the system of equations (5)- (8) converges to υ * β .
Proof. The proof follows by applying Theorem 11.5.3. of Puterman (1994) . To do this we must verify the following 1. Assumption 11.5.1 (Puterman (1994) ) implies that all transitions rates are bounded above. This is satisfied here with Λ being the upper bound.
2. There exists a function w : S → IR such that 2a. max a |r(s, a)| ≤ M w(s), ∀s ∈ S, where r(s, a) is the one period profit function in the discrete time MDP (5)- (8) and M is a constant.
2b. There exists a non-negative constant k < ∞ for which
for all a ∈ A(x, i) and (x, i) ∈ S.
2c. There exists constant α ∈ [0, 1) and J ∈ Z such that
We will verify that the function w(
To show 2a, note that
Thus, 2a holds for M = 1. To show 2b, for any (x, i) ∈ S and a ∈ A(x, i) the possible transitions are to states with x − 1, x or x + 1 customers. Since w is increasing,
From condition (c1), w(x + 1) ≤ θw(x), thus 2b holds for k = θ. Finally, for 2c, iterating the above inequality J times we obtain E π {w(X n+J , I n+J )|X n = x, I n = i} ≤ w(x + J). Therefore it suffices to show that Λ J w(x + J) ≤ αw(x) for some α < 1. However the last inequality holds by condition (c2).
The Optimal Threshold Policy
In this subsection, we derive the structure of the optimal policy. Specifically, we show in Theorem 2 that both admission and high service rate controls are based on respective thresholds on the queue length. Furthermore, in Proposition 1 we derive a sufficient condition between the values of the parameters R, c and δ, which makes the option to switch to the high service service rate be essentially of no value for the service provider.
Let a d n (x) be the optimal admission decision in state (x, 1) and a s n (x) the optimal service rate decision in state (x, 0) when n transitions remain. From the above optimality equations it follows that
where
denotes the loss in future rewards because of the increased load from an accepted arrival. In addition, let ∆h(x) = h(x+1)−h(x) be the increase in holding cost rate induced by an additional customer. In order to characterize the optimal policy, we first present some intermediate properties. Lemma 1 shows that the value function is nonincreasing in x.
Lemma 1 The value function υ n (x, i) is nonincreasing in x.
Proof. We will prove that υ n (x, i) is nonincreasing in x for any i = 0, 1, or equivalently that ∆ n (x, i) ≥ 0, by induction on n. By (8), we obtain ∆ 0 (x, i) = 0 and the statement holds for n = 0. Suppose that υ n (x, i) is nonincreasing in x for n. Then, for n + 1, we consider two cases: i = 0 and i = 1. Case I: i = 0 First, for x = 0, by (6) and (7), we obtain:
from the induction hypothesis. For x > 0, the terms of (6) are nonincreasing functions in x by the induction hypothesis, the assumption that h(x) is increasing in x and the fact that the maximum function of the nonincreasing functions δυ n (x, 0) and −c + δυ n (x − 1, 0) in x is nonincreasing in x. Therefore υ n (x, 0) is nonincreasing in x for any n. Case II For i = 1, we obtain similarly that υ n+1 (x, 1) is nonincreasing in x by (5) and the result proved in Case I. Therefore the statement in Lemma 1 holds for n + 1 and the proof is complete.
The monotonicity of υ n (x, i) in x is intuitive. It implies that ∆ n (x, i) is nonnegative, thus it can be seen as the burden or profit reduction induced by one additional customer in state (x, i).
In the next Theorem we show that the optimal policy is characterized by service and admission thresholds. We first define a generic threshold-type function that will be used in all the results.
For a function f : N 0 → IR and θ ∈ IR define
with the convention sup ∅ = −1. It is easy to see that T f (θ) has the following properties:
We now proceed to the Theorem.
Theorem 2 i. The value function υ n (x, i) is concave in x, for i = 0, 1.
ii. There exist thresholds B s n , B d n such that:
The proof is by induction on n. For n = 0, since υ 0 (x, i) = 0, we obtain ∆ 0 (x, i) = 0.
It follows that a s 1 (x) = l for all x ≥ 0, thus (15) and (16) hold with B s 0 = +∞. Furthermore, from (6) and (7), ∆ 1 (x, 0) = ∆h(x), x ≥ 0, where ∆h(x) is increasing by assumption, thus (17) holds with B d 1 = sup{k ≥ 1, ∆h(k) ≤ R}. Now suppose that i. holds for some n. In order to prove the Theorem, it suffices to show that ii. holds for n and i. holds for n + 1. To do this we will prove the following facts in sequence:
(a) (16) holds for n.
(c) (17) holds for n.
Thus υ n+1 (x, 0) is concave in x (i.e. ∆ n+1 (x, 0) ≤ ∆ n+1 (x + 1, 0)) for x ≤ B s n − 2 and for x ≥ B s n + 1, because of the convexity of the holding cost rate h(x) and the induction hypothesis. In order to complete the proof of (b) we must show that
By (19), we obtain the following.
and
From the convexity of h(x) and the induction hypothesis, we obtain:
By the definition of
By inequalities (21) through (27), (20) is proved.
As in (b), by (29) we obtain that υ n+1 (x, 1) is concave in x for x ≤ B d n+1 −2 and for x ≥ B d n+1 +1, because υ n+1 (x, 0) is concave in x, as we have proved in (b).
In order to complete the proof we have to consider the cases x = B d n+1 − 1 and x = B d n+1 , thus we need to show
After some algebra we obtain that
By the definition of B d n+1 , it follows that
By inequalities (31)-(34), (30) holds and this completes the proof of the Theorem. According to Theorem 2, the optimal action in state (x, 1) with n remaining transitions is twofold and prescribed by the pair (a d n (x), a s n (x)). It is optimal to accept the incoming customer if x ≤ B d n and reject him otherwise, whereas the optimal service rate for the time interval until the next transition is determined immediately after the admission action is taken, and the service rate is set to low if x ≤ B s n−1 and to high otherwise. The difference in the subscript between the admission and service thresholds is due to the fact that for the admission decision with n remaining steps the relevant burden function is ∆ n (·, 0) is relevant, while for the service rate decision it is ∆ n−1 (·, 0). On the other hand, in states (x, 0) the single optimal action is determined solely by a s n (x), the service rate to be employed until the next transition epoch. In the remainder of the paper it will be useful to adopt an alternative viewpoint and consider the optimal policy of admission/service control as pairs of decisions both taken at departure epochs. Specifically let
The pair a n+1 (x) can be seen as a decision made at state (x, 0) with n + 1 remaining steps, prescribing: (i) the service rate to be employed until the next transition epoch and (ii) whether to admit a new customer in the event that the next transition is an arrival. Thus, one may view the admission/rejection policy as a sign posted at the entrance of the system after every departure event. The sign specifies whether new arrivals are welcome to enter the system or not. Adopting this view, the pair a n+1 (x) specifies which service rate will be employed when n + 1 transitions remain, as well as which sign will be posted at that instant.
The following proposition shows that the service and admission thresholds are ordered in a specific way according to the values of parameters R, c and δ. More specifically, we show that, when R ≤ c δ , the availability of the high service rate is of limited value as a profit maximizing option. Indeed, in this case, whenever the high service rate is employed in a state x, the rejection sign is posted for arrivals at the next decision epoch.
n + 1 ≤ B s n and the optimal threshold policy is given by
From the definitions of B s n , B d n and the monotonicity of T f (θ) in θ, it follows that B s n = 1 + T ∆n(·,0) (
The possible cases for a n+1 (x) follow immediately given the inequality B s n ≥ 1 + B d n . Note that if R > c δ , it can be shown similarly that B d n +1 ≥ B s n , but we cannot generally make the opposite statement, i.e., that the service rate flexibility is employed beneficially, because in this case it can be shown that B d n + 1 ≥ B s n , which does not preclude the possibility that B d n + 1 = B s n , which falls in the case of Proposition 1. Therefore, R > c δ , i.e., that the relative cost of high service rate is sufficiently low compared to the service revenue, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the service rate switch option to be useful.
This leads to the question of the value of the high service rate option in general. In the following section, we explore more thoroughly this issue, by analyzing the value of service flexibility as a function of the system state.
The Value of Service Flexibility
Motivated by the discussion at the end of the previous section, we next explore how the service rate switch option affects, in terms of profit and admission thresholds, the system where only admission control is employed at the low rate. In terms of profit, we show that the option to increase service capacity becomes more profitable as the system congestion increases, whereas in terms of admission thresholds service flexibility ensures the fact that more customers could be accepted.
To assess the value of service rate flexibility, we note that the restriction of the combined problem described in (5)- (8), to the class of policies where the service rate is always set to low mode, is equivalent to a pure admission control subproblem (for a typical admission control formulation see Puterman (1994) , p.p.568-571). This restriction corresponds to the following set of optimality equations in finite horizon:
whereυ n (x, i) denotes the maximum discounted net profit for the remaining n transitions, when the service rate is set to µ l and admission is dynamically controlled. In the following we will refer to the restricted problem as the admission control subproblem. Letâ d n (x, 1) be the optimal decision in state (x, 1). From (35) to (37) it follows that
for x ≥ 0, where∆ n (x, i) =υ n (x, i) −υ n (x + 1, i) denotes the burden in terms of expected profit reduction that an additional customer brings to the defined system.
Similarly to Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, it can be shown thatυ n (x, i) is nonincreasing and concave in x, or equivalently that∆ n (x, i) is nonnegative and increasing in x.
Therefore, the optimal admission rule is characterized by admission thresholdŝ
so thatâ d n+1 (x, 1) = 1 if and only if x ≤B d n+1 , x ≥ 0, n = 0, 1, . . .. The threshold structure of the optimal policy is not new (see e.g. Walrand (1988 ), p.278, Puterman (1994 , p.568). We restate it here in a notation that allows comparison with the combined problem.
We cab now define the value of service flexibility as the benefit that the system administrator earns from using the service rate switch option, i.e.,ǫ n (x, i) = υ n (x, i) −υ n (x, i). It is immediate thatǫ n (x, i) ≥ 0, for all x, i, n.
In the next theorem, we first prove that the value of service flexibility is nondecreasing in the system length x, and thus the option to switch a higher service rate is more useful as the queue becomes longer, which is intuitively expected. Moreover, this is equivalent to the fact that the burden that an additional customer imposes on the system is lower when the high service rate option is available, compared to the pure admission control subproblem. This is also intuitive, since by increasing the service rate, it is possible to alleviate the extra delay because of the additional customer.
Secondly, we show that the admission thresholds are increased when the service rate switch is available, thus a customer who would not be accepted in the restricted system may be accepted when the system manager has the flexibility to switch to a higher service rate.
Theorem 3
i.ǫ n (x, i), is nondecreasing in x for all n, i.
ii.B d n ≤ B d n for all n.
Proof. Note that i. is equivalent to ∆ n (x, i) ≤∆ n (x, i) for any i ∈ {0, 1} and n = 0, 1, . . .. The proof is by induction on n. For n = 0, i. is immediate sinceǫ 0 (x, i) = 0, by initial conditions (8) and (38). Now suppose that i. holds for some n. We consider the following cases: Case 1: i = 0. For x > 0 by equations (6) and (36), we obtain
From the induction hypothesis and the fact that ∆ n (x − 1, 0) is increasing in x, it follows that ǫ n+1 (x, 0) is nondecreasing in x. Finally, for x = 0,
From the above equations it follows thatǫ n+1 (1, 0)−ǫ n+1 (0, 0) ≥ 0, by the induction hypothesis. Therefore,ǫ n+1 (x, 0) is nondecreasing in x, for x ≥ 0, thus ∆ n+1 (x, 0) ≤∆ n+1 (x, 0). By property (b) of the generic threshold-type function, T f (θ), we obtain that
n+1 , thus ii. holds for n + 1.
Case 2: i = 1. From the optimality equations (5), (35) and the propertyB d n+1 ≤ B d n+1 , ǫ n+1 (x, 1) can be written aŝ
To show monotonicity we consider further sub cases for x. Case 2a: x ≤B d n+1 . For x ≤B d n+1 − 1 by (40) we obtain thatǫ n+1 (x, 1) =ǫ n+1 (x + 1, 0), which is nondecreasing in x, from Case 1.
For 
Now that the properties ofǫ n (x, i) have been shown for the finite horizon version of the problem, it is natural to ask how the results of Proposition 1 are related to Theorem 3. In particular, one might conjecture that if R ≤ c δ , thenǫ n (x, 0) = 0 and B d n =B d n . However this may not be generally true for the following reason. If R ≤ c δ , then the high service rate is not used in states where customers are admitted. However it may still be used in states with large x although new arrivals are rejected, in order to empty the queue faster and reduce the holding costs. Thereforeǫ n (x, 0) could still be positive in such states. Furthermore, even for states with x small enough so that the optimal service rate is low in the combined problem, i.e., for
n it is not clear thatǫ n (x, 0) = 0. If the thresholds could be shown to be monotone with respect to the number of periods n, then the above could be shown by induction, however this monotonicity may not be true in general.
On the other hand, it has been shown in Theorem 1 that, under fairly general conditions on the holding cost function h(x), the finite horizon problems converge as n → ∞, to the infinite horizon problem, for which the optimal policy is stationary. For this limiting problem it is possible to prove an interesting relationship between Proposition 1 and Theorem 3, as we do next.
Service Rate Flexibility Under Infinite Horizon
In this subsection we show that under the sufficient condition R ≤ c δ stated in Proposition 1, the value of service flexibility is essentially of no value in low congestion states and the optimal admission thresholds are the same with and without the service rate switch option in the framework of the infinite horizon discounted problem.
Consider the infinite horizon problem and assume that the holding cost function satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. It follows that the value functions of the combined and the admission control subproblems converge to their infinite horizon counterparts υ(·, ·),υ(·, ·), which retain the monotonicity and concavity properties proved for finite n. Thus, the infinite horizon optimal policies are still threshold-based with time stationary thresholds, i.e., there exist B s , B d ,B d such that the optimal policy a = a(B s , B d ) for the combined problem is
and the optimal policyâ =â(B d ) for the admission control subproblem iŝ
Furthermore, the service rate flexibilityǫ(
We thus restrict attention to the class of stationary threshold-type policies. 
Proof. For the infinite horizon discounted profit maximization problem the value function corresponding to stationary policy π can be found as the unique solution to a system of linear equations corresponding to the policy evaluation step of the policy iteration method. Specifically, for policy π(b s , b d ) with b s > b d , the policy evaluation equations are We finally note that the first 2(b s + 1) equations are identical in the two problems above, therefore υ π (x, i) =υπ(x, i), for x = 0, 1, . . . , b s , i = 0, 1.
In the next proposition we make use of Lemma 2 to show that if the optimal policy a(B s , B d ) for the combined problem is such that B s ≥ B d + 1, then the service rate flexibility is equal to zero for states with x ≤ B s . Furthermore, the optimal admission threshold for the admission control subproblem is equal to that for the combined problem.
Proof. We have shown that the optimal admission thresholds generally satisfyB d ≤ B d . Assume that the optimal policy for the combined problem a(B s , B d ) satisfies B s ≥ B d + 1.
Consider the policyπ =π(B d ) for the admission control subproblem that applies admission threshold B d . From Lemma 2 it follows that υ a (x, i) =υπ(x, i), for x = 0, . . . , B s , i = 0, 1. However, υ(x, i) = υ a (x, i),υπ(x, i) ≤υ(x, i) ≤ υ(x, i) for all (x, i). It follows that υ(x, i) = υ(x, i), thusǫ(x, i) = 0, for x = 0, . . . , B s , i = 0, 1. Now suppose that the optimal policyâ(B d ) for the admission control subproblem is such thatB d < B d and consider state (B d + 1, 1) . By the definition ofB d it follows that admitting a customer in this state is strictly suboptimal for the admission control subproblem, i.e.,
On the other hand, for the combined problem admitting the customer in this state is optimal, i.e., We can now show that, for the infinite horizon case, Proposition 1 complements Theorem 3, in the sense that R ≤ c δ actually implies that adding the service rate switch possibility does not affect the admission threshold, and the value of flexibility is equal to zero for states with low congestion. This result is an immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 2.
The Average Reward Case
In this section, we consider the objective of expected average reward per unit time, and provide a sufficient condition under which a long-run average reward optimal policy exists and is obtained as a limit of the discounted reward problems as the discount rate β ↓ 0. This implies that that the results on the structure of the optimal policy and the value of service rate flexibility presented in the previous sections carry over to the average reward case. In this section we do not make the assumption that Λ + β = 1, since we consider sequences of values of β, keeping the remaining parameters fixed.
For each policy π ∈ Π, the long-run average expected net profit given that the initial state is (x, i) ∈ S is
denotes the expected net profit generated by the process (X(t), I(t)) up to time t with initial state (x, i) ∈ S and N t the number of admission decisions made up to time t. The optimal average expected net profit is defined as
A policy π * is characterized as average-reward optimal if g π * (x, i) = g * (x, i) for all (x, i) ∈ S. As in Section 2.1, we transform the problem into an equivalent model in discrete time using uniformization, where the expected time between decision epochs is equal to 1 Λ . The resulting discrete time Markov decision process is described by the following average reward optimality inequalities
with respect to a constant g and a real-valued function w on S. These correspond to the discretetime discounted optimality equations (5)- (8). Note that as the continuous discount rate β ↓ 0, the equivalent discrete-time discount factor Λ Λ+β ↑ 1. Theorem 7.2.3. of Sennott (1998) , provides a set of sufficient conditions (SEN assumptions, p.135) so that: (a) a solution (w, g) to (43)- (45) exists, (b) a long run average reward optimal policy exists, which realizes the maximum in (43)- (45) and is obtained as the limit of a sequence of discounted optimal policies under a subsequence of discount rates β n ↓ 0, (c) g is equal to the optimal average net profit and is obtained as a limit of the optimal discounted expected net profit for β ↓ 0 and (d) w(x, i) is a limit function of the sequence w βn = υ βn (x, i) − υ βn (0, 0) with β n ↓ 0.
In the following theorem we prove that Assumption 1, which was shown in Theorem 1 to be sufficient for the existence of a solution to the discounted problem, also ensures that the average reward problem has an optimal solution.
Theorem 5 If the holding cost rate function satisfies Assumption 1, then (i) There exists a stationary long-run average reward optimal policy π * , which is a limit point of a sequence of stationary discounted expected net profit optimal policies, i.e.,
where {β n , n ≥ 1} is any sequence of discount rates such that β n ↓ 0 and π βn is a β ndiscount optimal stationary policy.
(ii) The expected average net profit associated with π * is equal to
for every (x, i) ∈ S.
(iii) For any sequence β n ↓ 0 in (i), the sequence of functions {w βn , n ≥ 1} defined by
converges pointwise to a function w such that (w, g * ) satisfy (43)-(45).
Proof. From Theorem 7.2.3. of Sennott (1998) it is sufficient to verify the SEN assumptions. In our problem the state space S is countable and from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 the value function υ(x, i) of the discounted problem is nonincreasing in x ∈ IN 0 for any i ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, we can apply Corollary 7.5.4 of Sennott (1998) , which states that a sufficient condition for SEN assumptions to hold in this case is the existence of a 0-standard policy, i.e. a (generally randomized) policy d which induces an irreducible and positive recurrent Markov process with finite expected first passage time from any state s to state 0, m s0 < ∞, s ∈ S and expected first passage profit from any state s to state 0,
To show the existence of a 0-standard policy, for any p ∈ [0, 1] let d(p) be the randomized policy under which the service rate is always set to µ l and arriving customers are admitted with probability p. If p is such that λp µ l < 1, then under policy d(p) the system is equivalent to a stable M/M/1 queue {X t , t ≥ 0}, with state X t denoting the number of customers in the system, arrival rate λp, service rate µ l admission reward R and cost rate h(x) while in state x.
The discrete-time equivalent of this process corresponds to a positive recurrent Markov chain {X n , n = 0, 1, . . .}, with transition probabilities
and one-step rewards r(x) = Rλp−h(x) Λ . Let N = min{n > 0 : X n = 0} denote the first passage time to state 0. It is well known that the expected first passage times to state 0 in the continuous-time M/M/1 queue are equal to x µ l −λp , x > 0, thus in the discrete time model
Now consider the first passage expected profit
Thus, to show that w x0 > −∞, it suffices to show that the expected first passage holding cost is finite, i.e.,
From Corollary C.2.4 of Sennott (1998) it follows that in order to show H x < ∞, it is sufficient to establish that there exists a nonnegative finite function W (x) such that
We will prove that there exist a sufficiently small p and a sufficiently large M > 0 such that these inequalities are satisfied by function W (x) = M θ x , where θ > 1 is the constant appearing in Assumption 1. First, (47) is immediate,
On the other hand, from Assumption 1 (i), it follows that h(x) ≤ h(1)θ x−1 , x > 0. Therefore, if we take p < min(
Summarizing, we have shown that for sufficiently small p there exists a function W (x) satisfying (47), (48), thus policy d(p) is 0 standard and the proof of the theorem is complete. From Corollary 7.5.4 of Sennott (1998) , we also obtain that the relative value function w(x, i) is nonnegative and nonincreasing in x for any i.
The results on the structure of the discounted optimal policy are extended to the average reward case, since the average optimal policy is obtained as a limit of a sequence of discounted optimal policies.
Specifically, there exist admission and service thresholds as in Theorem 2 and if R ≤ c δ the thresholds are ordered as in Proposition 1, and in this case the service rate flexibility is of no value.
Reward Collected at Departure Epochs
In the previous sections it was assumed that the reward R is collected upon admitting a customer. While this is plausible in many situations such as ticket-based operations or call centers with upfront charge, it is also often the case that the service reward is collected at the time of departure of the customer, for example in jobshops with payment upon delivery. In this section we formulate the corresponding MDP model for the second case, point out the similarities and differences and show that essentially all the conclusions obtained so far still hold.
When R is collected at departure epochs, the Markov Decision Process in finite horizon corresponding to (5)-(8) now takes the following form:
Note that in (49)- (52) the term for R is added at transitions from (x, 0) to (x − 1, 0), whereas at admission epochs there is no reward collected.
As in the original model, let ∆ n (x, i) = υ n (x, i) − υ n (x + 1, i).
One and, in essense, the only difference between the two models is that Lemma 1 is not true anymore, i.e., the value function is not nonincreasing in x. This is intuitively expected, since an additional customer in the queue brings with him the prospect of a future reward as well as a burden due to the higher holding costs. Mathematically, the induction proof of Lemma 1 breaks down at state (0, 0). Indeed, it is now true that ∆ n+1 (0, 0) = h(1) − µ l R + λ∆ n (0, 1) + min{δ∆ n (0, 0), c − δR}, which is not necessarily nonnegative due to terms −µ l R and −δR.
Therefore, it is not generally true anymore that ∆ n (x, i) ≥ 0, thus it cannot be interpreted as a burden, but rather as the net effect of an additional customer, which can be either a burden or a benefit.
On the other hand, by following the remaining proofs in the original model, it can be verified that all the results on the monotonicity of ∆ n (x, 0) in x, the threshold structure of the optimal policy and the properties of the value of flexibility function still hold. The admission and service rate thresholds now take the form
where ∆ n corresponds to the new net effect function and T f (θ) is the same generic threshold function defined in (14).
Computational Results
In this section we present the results of some computational experiments, which explore the value of service rate flexibility and the influence of the service rate switch option on the optimal admission policy. In the previous sections it was established analytically that when R ≤ c δ the service rate flexibility is essentially of no value. This is so because from Proposition 2, B s ≥ B d + 1, thus either the system stops accepting customers before the higher service rate is used, or the higher service rate is employed at the last state before the rejection sign is posted. Theorem 4 further implies that in this case the optimal admission thresholds are the same with and without the service rate switch option. However, even if R > c δ , it may still be true that
Our first numerical experiment demonstrates that, although the relationship between R and c δ by itself does not uniquely characterize the value of service rate flexibility, it provides a good approximation for such a characterization. To do so, we consider a system with λ = 5, µ l = 3, µ h = 5, c = 6, h(x) = x 2 , β = 0.5 and varying value of R. Figure 1 shows the relative value of the service rate flexibility as a fraction of the total profit of the combined problem at state (0, 0) (panel (a)). We observe that the relative value of the service flexibility is increasing in R, when R > In all numerical cases we analyzed we observed similar behavior, i.e., there exists a critical value of R above which it is true that B s > B d , and this critical value is higher but close to c/δ.
In the third numerical experiment we explore the sensitivity of the service flexibility with respect to the relative increase δ µ l in service capacity, offered by introducing the high service rate option. This effect is presented for two values of the traffic intensity, λ, one low, λ = 2, and one high, λ = 20. To do so, we consider a system with µ l = 3, R = 4, c = 8, h(x) = x 2 , β = 1 and varying value of the high service rate µ h .
In Table 1 we present numerical results for the relative value of the service flexibility as a fraction of the total profit of the combined problem at state (0, 0) and for the values of service and admission thresholds of the combined and the admission problem, respectively, for the two values of the traffic intensity. We observe that the value of flexibility and the admission thresholds are increasing in δ µ l , where on the other hand, the service threshold is decreasing. We also note that, as expected, when δ ≤ c R the flexibility is essentially of no value and B s = B d + 1. Finally, the effect of the higher traffic rate is more pronounced in the value of flexibility than in the threshold values.
Note that in all numerical experiments the parameters do not generally satisfy the normalization assumption, Λ + β = 1. However, the required rescaling has been performed in the computations.
Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper we analyzed the problem of joint dynamic admission and service control in an M/M/1 queue under expected discounted profit maximization. We established a threshold structure for the optimal service rate-admission control policy. We defined the value of the service rate flexibility as the benefit that the higher service rate option brings to a system with pure admission control, and showed that the value of flexibility is increasing with system congestion. We finally identified a simple condition between the admission reward and the relative cost of high service rate, under which the admission policy is not affected and the value of service flexibility is zero in low congestion states. The analysis in this paper was conducted in the context of an M/M/1 queue, where the high service rate means that the server operates with higher speed. However in many real applications such as banks or call centers the service capacity is affected by dynamically varying the number of operating servers. This corresponds to an M/M/m queue with m being determined by a dynamic policy. We conjecture that the admission policy will still be threshold-based. On the other hand, it would be interesting to study how the service rate policy is structured under different assumptions on the service rate switch option, e.g. assuming that all servers are required to use the same service rate, or that each server is allowed to select its own rate. Furthermore, the assumption of identical customers may be relaxed by assuming multiple customer classes differentiated by admission reward and/or service rate. If the service rates are identical among classes, it is expected that the optimal admission policy is determined by class-dependent admission thresholds which are increased when the high service rate option becomes available. It would also be interesting to consider the value of service rate flexibility when there is a fixed service rate switch cost, which brings hysteretic policies into play. Finally, in the present model we considered maximization of net profit from the point of view of a single decision maker, who may be the system owner or a collective representative maximizing the total customer benefit. It would be interesting to consider equilibrium strategies in a game theoretic model where the server determines the service rate and arriving customers respond by deciding individually whether to join the queue or balk. Such a model could also include pricing as an additional policy component available to the server. The extension to equilibrium models with dynamic service control is the object of our current research work.
